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INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 1058  
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0706  
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0038  
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0149  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1303  
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 2606  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1691  
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 1090  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0693

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000579

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BUJUMBURA FOR DAS YAMAMOTO; PARIS AND LONDON FOR  
AFRICAWATCHERS, TREASURY FOR OTA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017  
TAGS: [PREF](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [EPET](#) [ENRG](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: CHAD: PRESIDENT DEBY THANKS U.S. FOR SUPPORT

Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASON 1.4 (B)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Ambassador Wall on April 20, President Deby thanked the United States for condemning Sudan's role in the recent attacks on Chad. He shared information on what he feared would be a new attack in the East in the coming days, and stated that Sudan was also arming Central African Republic rebels. He hoped for a positive telephone conversation with World Bank President Wolfowitz but said he preferred to be without oil than to have Chad's money blocked. End Summary.

¶2. (C) President Deby called Ambassador Wall to a meeting on Thursday, April 20, at the Presidential Palace. Also present at the meeting were DCM (notetaker), Personal Secretary (and First Lady) Hinda Itno, and a Chadian notetaker. President Deby explained that he had hoped to see the Ambassador on April 19, but had learned that the Ambassador was traveling in the East to visit Sudanese refugee camps. He explained that he wanted to tell the Ambassador that Sudan was continuing to equip rebels, and that he had information that Sudan was assisting forces from the Central African Republic (CAR) to meet up with the Chadian rebels and Sudanese mercenaries.

¶3. (C) President Deby explained that the CAR forces were supporters of the former CAR President, and that their aim was, after taking Chad, to take the CAR. President Deby continued that they had information that some 30 vehicles were preparing to enter Chad and were aiming to attack Adre and Abeche. The GOC expected this assault to take place sometime between today (April 20) and Sunday, April 23.

¶4. (C) The second motive for the meeting was to convey President Deby's thanks to Ambassador Wall and to President Bush for firmly condemning the Government of Sudan for its role in the rebel attacks. The United States was, according to the President, the only country that had done so, and he was particularly touched by this. He reiterated again that Chad owed sincere thanks to Ambassador Wall and to President Bush.

¶5. (C) Turning to the issue of the impasse between the Government of Chad (GOC) and the World Bank, President Deby referred to the upcoming visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary

(DAS) Don Yamamoto and the U.S. request to delay the shutdown of oil production. He noted that he had agreed to delay the oil shut down until the end of the month. He hoped that before that date agreement could be reached. President Deby mentioned that he would be speaking with World Bank President Wolfowitz at 10:30 a.m.

¶15. (C) Ambassador Wall explained that one reason for his visit to the east of Chad had been to call attention to the situation on the border in the company of a large group of journalists (both Chadian and international press). He had called on Sudan to stop the violence in the border area and to support international efforts to defuse tensions. Ambassador Wall noted that DAS Yamamoto's visit had been scheduled for some time, and that he would be raising a number of issues with the President. Ambassador Wall explained that DAS Yamamoto would not be mediating but that he did want to encourage efforts to reach agreement.

¶16. (C) President Deby stated that he was open for a dialogue on all questions -- and especially for finding a way out of the World Bank impasse. He explained that Chad had waited four months for a solution. He had agreed to postpone the shutdown as a result of the State Department letter, but he earnestly hoped that a solution would be found. He affirmed that he would prefer to be without oil than to have Chad's money blocked. Continuing in this vein, he stated that it was inadmissible for the World Bank to block Chad's resources, given Chad's poverty. The money was needed in the 2006 budget. Ambassador Wall interjected that Chad could stand to lose hundreds of millions in tax receipts next year if it shut down production. President Deby dismissed this by saying that he did not know anything about that. What he knew was that right now they were supposed to be finishing health clinics, opening schools and paying salaries, and this wasn't possible because the funds were blocked.

¶17. (C) In conclusion, Ambassador Wall noted that the press was likely to produce a number of stories relating to the previous day's visit to eastern Chad, and he wanted to make sure that President Deby knew what points Ambassador Wall had made to the press. He passed President Deby the press points which the Public Diplomacy section had prepared for the visit from press guidance and statements by Department representatives. President Deby expressed appreciation for the points, and once again thanked the Ambassador and President Bush for U.S. support.

Comment:

¶18. (C) President Deby's comments highlight his appreciation for the strong U.S. statements on the border situation and his worries about more attacks to come. We hope this meeting helped dampen his expectations for U.S. involvement in breaking the impasse with the World Bank over oil revenue management, but we remain concerned that he still hopes for more than we intend to try to deliver. Once the points raised in the Department's guidance and the Ambassador's remarks about the need for political dialogue have had time to sink in, we look forward to pursuing them with him. We await his reaction with great interest, but he has given little indication in the past to suggest he would be open to such an exchange. End comment.

WALL